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BENEFICIARIES OF SALES WARRANTIES IN NEW
YORK: SOME QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS
ON NEW LEGAL DOCTRINE
CARL M. SELINGER *
The particular legal data to be considered comes from the state
of New York and from the field of commercial law. But, the data
raises issues of wider significance geographically and legally.'
I. THE Greenberg DECISION
Oh, it's fine to be a genius of course
But keep that old horse
Before the cart
First, you've gotta have heart.
From a popular tune of the period.'
In the spring of 1961, the New York Court of Appeals showed
New York citizens, and the legal world, that it had heart. Sheila Green-
berg, a fifteen-year old high school student, was injured at the family
dinner table when she bit into a piece of canned salmon that concealed
a metal fish tag. Sheila's father bought the can of salmon from a neigh-
borhood retail store. More than three years of litigation and six judi-
cial opinions (majority, concurring and dissenting) later, the Court of
Appeals held in Greenberg v. Lorenz' that Sheila could recover dam-
ages from the retailer for breach of the statutory implied warranties
of fitness and wholesomeness (merchantable quality),' although the
parties had not been in privity of contract.
The opinion by Chief Judge Desmond first considers the New
York authorities on the privity question:
Our difficulty is not in finding the applicable rule but in
deciding whether or not to change it. The decisions are clear
* Professor of Law, Union University, Albany Law School. A.B., University of
California at Berkeley, 1955; LL.B., Harvard, 1958. The author wishes to thank Pro-
fessor William Samore for his helpful criticisms of a draft of this article,
1 The technique chosen for dealing with these issues is modeled in part after that
employed by Professors Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process (tent. ed. 1958).
2 Heart, from the Abbot & Wallop play, DAMN YANKEES, p. 25 (1955).
3 9 N,Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 .(1961).
4 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 96 (Uniform Sales Act § 15) provides, in part, as follows:
1. Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller
the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that
the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower
or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
reasonably fit for such purpose,
2. Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in
goods of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not),
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.
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enough. There can be no warranty, express or implied, with-
out privity of contract (Turner v. Edison Storage Battery
Co.5
 . . . ; Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co.° . . .) since a war-
ranty is an incident of a contract of sale (Fairbank Canning
Co. v. Metzger' . . .). The warranty does not run with the
chattel (Nichols v., Clark, MacMullen & Riley . . .).
Therefore, as to food or other merchandise, there are no
implied warranties of merchantability or fitness except as
to the buyer (Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co.° . . . ; Ryan v.
Progressive Grocery Stores' . . .). A wife buying food for
her husband may be considered his agent so as to allow a
recovery by him (Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores . . .)
and she can bring an action of her own if she makes the pur-
chase and suffers from the breach of warranty (Gimenez v.
Great A. & P. Tea Co." .. .). When two sisters lived in
a common household, the one who bought the food was
deemed an agent of the other (Bowman v. Great A. & P. Tea
Co. 12 . . .). The same (Bowman) theory was expanded to
let both husband and wife recover (Mouren v. Great A. & P.
Tea Co." .. .). But a dependent child is not a contracting
party and cannot be a warrantee so no damages are due him
(Redmond v. Borden's Farm Products Co." . . .). [Foot-
notes added.] 15
Then the court deals with the question of departing from the
authorities:
The unfairness of the restriction has been argued in
writings so numerous as to make a lengthy bibliography.' 6
. . . About 20 states have abolished such requirements of
5 248 N.Y. 73, 74, 161 N.E. 423, 424 (1928).
6 276 N.Y. 172, 11 N.E.2d 718 (1937).
7 118 N.Y. 260, 265, 23 N.E. 372, 373 (1890).
g 261 N.Y. 118, 184 N.E. 729 (1933).
9 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
10
 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
11 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934).
12 308 N.Y. 780, 125 N.E.2d 165 (1955).
13 1 N.Y.2d 884, 154 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1956).
14
 245 N.Y. 512, 157 N.E. 838 (1927).
16 9 N.Y.2d at 198-99, 173 N.E.2d at 774-75, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
16 Citing as examples: Starke, Implied Warranties of Quality and Wholesomeness
in the Sale of Food, N.Y.L.J. April 8, 9, 10, 1957, p. 4, col. 1 (vol. 137, nos. 67-69) ;
1943 Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n 413; 1945 Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n
23; 1959 Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n 57; Miller, N.Y. State Bar Bulletin 313
(Oct. 1952) ; Melick, Sale of Food and Drink 94; Prosser, Torts 493 (2d ed. 1955) ; 29
Fordham L. Rev. 83 (1960) ; 44 Cornell L.Q. 608 (1959) ; 34 N.Y.I.T,L. Rev. 442 (1959) ;
35 St. John's L. Rev. 178 (1960).
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privity, the latest being Virginia and New Jersey (Swift &
Co. v. Wells'' . . ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors's
. . .). The Uniform Commercial Code (§ 2-318) provides
that: 'A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends
to any natural person who is in the family or household of
his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to
expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty.' In 1943, 1945 and 1959 the New York State Law
Revision Commission, each time after careful study, recom-
mended that the implied warranty of fitness for use should
extend to the buyer's household, members, employees and
guests. The Legislature did not act on any of the commis-
sion's proposals.
The injustice of denying damages to a child because of
non-privity seems too plain for argument. The only real
doubt is as to the propriety of changing the rule. Of course,
objection will be made (as it has been made before in other
such situations, see Woods v. Lancet'° . . . ; Bing v. Thunig 2°
. . .). But the present rule which we are being asked to
modify is itself of judicial making since our statutes say
nothing at all about privity and in early times such liabilities
were thought to be in tort. 2 ' ... Alteration of the law in
such matters has been the business of the New York courts
for many years (MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co." . . ;
Ultramares Corp. v. Touches'' . . .).
The Ryan, Giminez and Bowman cases" . . . in our
court show an increasing tendency to lessen the rigors of the
rule. In Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp. 25 . .. we
passed on a Statute of Limitations point only but we did not
(as we could have under the old cases) dismiss for insuffi-
ciency a complaint which demanded damages for an infant's
death when the dangerous article had been purchased by the
infant's mother. There are a great many well-considered
lower court decisions in this State which attest to the preva-
lent feeling that at least as to injured members of a buyer's
17 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959).
18 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
19
 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
20 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
21 Prosser, Torts 507 (2d ed. 1955) ; 1 Williston, Sales 502 (rev. ed. 1948).
22 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
23 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
24 Supra notes 10, 11 & 12, respectively.
25 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N,E.2d 421 (1953).
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family the strict privity rule is unfair and should be revised.
[Footnotes added.]"
Finally, the court reaches its decision with respect to the stare
decisis problem and undertakes to spell out the significance of its
present holding:
So convincing a showing of injustice and impracticality
calls upon us to move but we should be cautious and take
one step at a time. To decide the case before us, we should
hold that the infant's cause of action should not have been
dismissed solely on the ground that the food was purchased
not by the child but by the child's father. Today when so
much of our food is bought in packages it is not just or
sensible to confine the warranty's protection to the indi-
vidual buyer. At least as to food and household goods, the
presumption should be that the purchase was made for all
the members of the household.27
II. Greenberg IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
A. The Court's Decision to Depart from Precedent
Just why, precisely, did the court choose to depart from prece-
dent? Because a lot of learned authors said it should, by a show of
hands in books, reports and law review articles? Because courts in
other jurisdictions had departed from similar precedents? Because
statutes had been proposed to alter the precedents? Because, in the
light of the prior warnings, the defendant should have insured against
this damage liability and therefore could not claim unfair surprise?"
Because, in the light of the actuarial process involved in fixing insur-
ance rates, defendant's insurance company could not claim unfair
surprise? 29
Considering the potent values that support the doctrine of stare
decisis, do the above reasons, taken singly or together, justify a
failure to adhere to precedent in the absence of one or more good
26 Supra note 3, at 199-200, 173 N.E.2d at 775, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 41-42.
27 Id. at 200, 173 N.E.2d 775-76, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
28 See Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 Ha•rv, L. Rev. 463,
492 (1962).
29 See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process—The Insignificance
of Foresight, 70 Yale L.J. 554, 569-74, 579-81 (1961). In the peculiar case of New York
retailers, for whom rates are calculated on a state-wide rather than a nation-wide basis,
the lack of unfair surprise is clearer under Professor Morris' analysis where the loss is
ultimately borne by the manufacturer's insurer, either by way of action over against
the manufacturer for breach of warranty or directly under an "additional interests of
vendors" clause, protecting the retailer. In Greenberg, a third party claim against the
canner was withdrawn, and the canner's attorneys assumed the defense of the retailer.
Record, p. 58.
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reasons why a contrary decision would be better?" Are such reasons
set forth in the Greenberg opinion with any reasonable degree of
clarity? Recall the statement that "the injustice of denying damages
to a child because of non-privity seems too plain for argument."
Suppose there were good reasons for declining to adhere to prece-
dent, and suppose these reasons are too plain for argument, does that
make them too plain to be worth stating? Do the values upon which
the doctrine of stare decisis is based become irrelevant once a court
has rightly decided to depart from precedent? Perhaps not! At any
rate, that which follows is an attempt to explore some of the implica-
tions of the last question.
B. The Peculiar Function of Courts of Last Resort
The New York Court of Appeals stands, as do other courts of
last resort, at the apex of what Professors Hart and Sacks have
denoted a "great pyramid of legal order." The pyramid is grounded
in those myriad individual and group decisions which happily are
effectuated without dispute, and then ranges upward through the rela-
tively small number of disputes that do arise and must be settled—
privately in most instances, but sometimes officially, in trial courts or,
infrequently, in appellate courts.' Focusing solely on matters of
dispute, a great number of individuals at various levels of the pyramid
are called upon to effect settlements. Yet society demands, and rightly
so, evenhandedness of decision, from settler to settler, and from level
to level. To satisfy this demand, it is necessary to have legal doctrines
to which all decisions are expected to conform. 32
 Apart from the legis-
lature, only a court of last resort can announce such doctrines.
Further, it must be recognized that a single court of last resort can
only hear and conscientiously decide a minute fraction of the total
number of disputes.
Given these circumstances, is a court of last resort doing its job
adequately when it writes an opinion that merely tells "who wins"?
Consider the following statement about opinions of the United States
Supreme Court:
[T]he test of the quality of an opinion is the light it casts,
outside the four corners of the particular lawsuit, in guiding
the judgment of the hundreds of thousands of lawyers and
government officials who have to deal at first hand with the
problems of everyday life and of thousands of judges who
have to handle the great mass of litigation which ultimately
develops."
30
 See Hart & Sacks, op. cit. supra note 1, at 587-88, 601-02,
31 Id. at 312-13.
32
 See Keeton, supra note 28, at 468-69.
33
 Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958
Term, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 96 (1959).
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Would there be any merit to a belief that there is less necessity
for guidance in a situation in which a court of last resort has chosen
to depart from precedent than in a situation where the court has
chosen to rely upon and extend precedent?
C. The Limited Utility of the Statement of Facts
Like most full judicial opinions, the Greenberg opinion contains
a statement of the facts of the case on which the decision is based.
Certainly, an inquiry into what facts an opinion emphasizes and what
facts it deemphasizes or excludes can be helpful in its interpretation.
Significance may be attached to the omission in the present opinion
of any mention of the fact that Sheila had requested her father to
buy the can of salmon—a fact found by the trial judge," mentioned
in the opinion of the appellate term" and relied upon by Judge
Froessel of the Court of Appeals in a concurring opinion.'" In fact, a
murmur from the factual chasm in the majority opinion all but
says that "we are not deciding this case on any principal-agent
relationship." But, putting the concurring opinion aside, do harried
trial lawyers and trial judges in the ordinary situation, have the time
and inclination to deal adequately with such subtleties? As to the
murmur in Greenberg, see the opinion of the trial court judge in
Walla v. Contractors Syracuse Sales Co.," as quoted, infra.'
D. The Choice of a Narrow Ground for Decision
Plainly, the overall tenor of the Greenberg opinion is one of
restraint, and there is evidence of a desire to place the decision on
relatively narrow grounds.
Once a court has decided to depart from precedent, what limita-
tions, if any, does a recognition of the function of a court of last
resort impose on the court's freedom to state narrow grounds for deci-
sion? One limitation has been suggested by Professor Keeton. With
regard to "the principle sometimes urged that a court in acting crea-
tively should adopt the narrowest possible ground of departure that
will cover the case at hand," he says that
in fact, that principle, urged in the name of continuity, is less
conducive to predictability of decisions than is the expres-
sion of broader grounds that actually guide the court to its
decision, even though the expression of the broader grounds
may befuddle efforts to find a clear line of demarcation be-
tween holding and dictum. Expression of a narrower ground
34 14 Misc. 2d 279, 178 N.Y.S.2d 404 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957).
35
 12 Misc. 2d 883, 178 N.Y.S.2d 407 (App. T. 1958).
80 Supra note 3, at 200, 173 N.E.2d at 776, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
37 31 Misc. 2d 77, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Sup. Ct. 1961),
38 See text following note 66 infra.
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of decision may appropriately be chosen where the court's
attraction to the broader principle falls short of conviction.
But where conviction has been reached, an opinion placing
the decision on a narrower ground is misleading.35
Are there even more obvious limitations? Consider the various
narrow grounds for decision suggested by the Greenberg opinion.
Perhaps the clearest "reason" in the opinion for the majority's
decision to depart from precedent is contained in the sentence: "Today
when so much of our food is bought in packages it is not just or
sensible to confine the warranty's protection to the individual buyer."
But what has food sold in packages to do with who should win in the
Greenberg case? In days before food was sold in packages did not
teenage daughters eat food purchased by fathers?. Or is this a matter
of proof of causation? Obviously, the question of such proof does
not differ significantly as between father and teenage daughter in the
Greenberg situation today. Did it before food was sold in packages?
Or is this a matter of the ability of the purchaser or ultimate consumer
to detect the fish tag? Presumably, the fish tag was embedded in the
fish. There is no indication in the record that Sheila ate the fish, can
and all. And again, what difference between Sheila and her father,
now or before the days of packaging?
Of course, the question of packaging is relevant to the ability
of the retailer to detect and eliminate unsafe products. But, a lack of
this ability would seem to cut against his liability," or at least indi-
cate that ultimate liability should fall, as expeditiously as possible,
on the party who may have the ability, i.e., the processor. There are
other arguments for direct manufacturer's liability, but these involve
the elimination of certain stumbling blocks in the road to a liability
which the manufacturer was, in the ordinary situation, required to
ultimately bear long before Greenberg." In terms used by Profes-
sors Hogan and Penney, direct manufacturer's liability presents prob-
lems of "potential defendants," but the Greenberg situation raises
questions of "potential plaintiffs."' Thus, the question of packaging
takes one far afield. Is it ever proper for the sake of restraint to state
as a ground for decision a principle that is irrelevant to the dispute to
be decided?
39
 Keeton, supra note 28, at 488-89 (footnote omitted). For a general analysis of
doctrinal formulation in light of the necessity for guidance, see id. at 497-99.
40 See generally Waite, Retail Responsibility and Judicial Law Making, 34 Mich.
L. Rev. 494 (1936).
41
 See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1123-24 (1960).
42
 Hogan & Penney, Annotations to the Uniform Commercial Code to the Statutory
and Decisional Law of New York State, N.Y. Comm'n On Uniform State Laws, New
York Annotations to Uniform Commercial Code and Report of Commission on
Uniform Commercial Code 47 (1961).
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Notice next that the opinion states as the touchstone of liability
the conclusion that "the purchase was made for" the plaintiff. If the
court means that recovery is granted because Sheila was in a con-
tractual relationship with the defendant retailer, would this be a
legitimate narrow ground for decision? Presumably, the court intends
to abandon the principal-agent rationale that had previously proved
so troublesome.' Apparently, the only other justification for resting
liability on such a conclusion would involve a finding that the plaintiff
was a third party beneficiary, in the traditional contract sense, of the
contract between the retailer and the purchaser. This analysis requires
at the outset a search for an objective manifestation of the promisor's
intention to benefit the third party. Thus, in the unlikely event that
the retailer expressly warrants the goods in such a manner as to indi-
cate an intention to benefit the ultimate consumer, this analysis might
be useful.'" Similarly, it might be useful if the retailer has reason to
know that the product will be used by a third person." But the
present case involved neither of these situations. Therefore, would it be
proper for the court, for the sake of restraint, to utilize without dis-
cussion a well-developed legal doctrine as a ground for decision in a
case where the traditional requisites for its application are not ob-
viously present?"
Finally, there are indications in the Greenberg opinion that, for
the present, the privity bar is intended to be raised only as to certain
products (food and household goods) and certain nonpurchasing plain-
tiffs (members of the buyer's household). If this is the court's inten-
tion, is it not of paramount importance that these categories accurately
reflect some underlying legal principle? Is it likely that categories of
the kind suggested in Greenberg will do so? If the relevant legal
principles apply beyond the named categories, would a later judicial
decision based solely on the fact that the case does not fall within the
categories be entitled to the respect ordinarily accorded judicial deci-
sions?' Can the problem with respect to a given category be side-
stepped by pointing out that similar categories were used by the drafts-
43
 The New York courts had held so often that a purchasing wife was merely her
husband's agent, for purposes of permitting the husband to recover for his injuries,
that at one point a trial court denied recovery where the purchasing wife was herself
injured, on the ground that there was no privity between the wife and the seller.
Vaccaro v. Prudential Condensed Milk Co., 133 Misc. .556, 232 N.Y. Supp. 299 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1927).
44 4 Corbin, Contracts § 773 (1951).
45
 Cf. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928) (a
case involving the direct liability of a manufacturer).
46
 The New York Court of Appeals seems more clearly to have done this sort of
thing in a recent negotiable instruments case. See First Nat'l Bank v. Fazzari, 10
N.Y.2d 394, 179 N.E.2d 493, 223 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1961), 26 Albany L. Rev. 334 (1962).
47
 Cf. Excerpts from Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication (Unpublished
paper, 1957), reproduced in Hart & Sacks, op. cit. supra note 1, at 421.
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men of the Uniform Commercial Code or of some other proposed
statute?"
Of course, once a court of last resort has announced certain
categories, it is not foreclosed from re-examining these categories in
later cases. The "one step at a time" language in Greenberg seems to
anticipate such a process. Does the availability of re-examination on
appeal relieve the court of the burden of testing the categories against
underlying legal principle in the first instance? Consider the costs of
appellate justice in time and money to the parties and to society gen-
erally. Consider also the extent to which the spectre of a necessary
appeal may cast a distorting shadow over the efforts of litigants or
prospective litigants to reach a private settlement before any judicial
determination.
Do not these latter considerations also suggest another limitation
on the kinds of narrow legal principles that may wisely be chosen as
the basis for decision? For example, prior to Greenberg, a consider-
able number of courts outside of New York had carved out an "excep-
tion" to the privity requirement in food cases." In one of the best
known of these cases, Jacob E. Decker & Son v. Capps," the Texas
Supreme Court, after pointing out that the ultimate consumer of food
is usually unable to ascertain whether it is fit for human consumption,
further explains the food exception as follows:
It seems to be the rule that where food products sold for
human consumption are unfit for that purpose, there is such
an utter failure of the purpose for which the food is sold, and
the consequences of eating unsound food are so disastrous
to human health and life, that the law imposes a warranty
of purety in favor of the ultimate consumer as a matter of
public policy."
Would it have been wise for the Court of Appeals in 1961 to have
based its decision on such reasoning with respect to the peculiar nature
of food cases? In view of the fact that eminent legal scholars from
Llewellyn' to James" and Prosser" had, after careful analysis, over-
whelmingly rejected the notion that a public policy calling for protec-
tion of the ultimate consumer could be limited to injuries caused by
48 Cf. Hart & Sacks, op. cit. supra note 1, at 397-98.
4 U Sec Prosser, supra note 41, at 1103-10.
50 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
ra Id. at 612, 164 S.W.2d at 829.
52 Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 341,
404-08 (1937).
53 James, General Products—Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?,
24 Tenn. L. Rev. 923, 926 (1957).
54 Prosser, supra note 41, at 1138-40.
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bad food?" In view of the fact that two jurisdictions which had orig-
inally recognized an exception in the case of food had extended the
"exception" in recent cases involving other products," and the supreme
court of a neighboring jurisdiction had reasoned as follows in breaking
the bonds of privity for the first time?
We see no rational basis for differentiating between a
fly in a bottle of beverage and a defective automobile. The
unwholesome beverage may bring illness to one person; the
defective car, with its great potentiality for harm to the
driver, occupants and others, demands even less adherence
to the narrow barriers of privity."
If, in choosing a narrow ground for decision, a court ignores the
analytic work of legal scholars and the experience of courts in other
jurisdictions, does the court not expose itself to an undue risk that it
may be compelled to do by halves—at the cost of unnecessary appeals
or worse—what ought to have been done at once?
Coming back to categories of products and plaintiffs, the court
in Greenberg does qualify its categorization by the phrase "at least."
Does this qualification obviate the necessity of basing the categoriza-
tion on underlying legal principle? Of stating such principle? Is it
possible for trial lawyers and trial judges to ascertain what situations
are "at most" without knowing why those specified are "at least"?
Was there a sound, but relatively narrow, basis for decision
available to the court of appeals in Greenberg? Could not such a
basis for decision have been derived from those earlier decisions that
had evaded the privity requirement in warranty cases? Indeed, if a
court is not to go beyond the proper function of adjudication, must
not each of its decisions—even one departing from precedents directly
in point—be based upon some pre-existing legal principle? 58
Suppose the Court of Appeals had said the following:
In previous cases, this court has held that a seller may
be liable for breach of warranty to an injured plaintiff who
did not pay for the goods. True, this liability has been stated
in terms of a principal-agent relationship between the
plaintiff and the person who paid for the goods. But, as the
relationship has been presumed even in the absence of the
evidence usually necessary to establish agency, the form of
statement should not have concealed the actual basis for the
decisions. In each case, the relationship between the person
55
 Cf. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 429 (1960).
50
 Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575 (1960) (grinding
wheel); Martin v. J. C. Penney Co., 50 Wash. 2d 560, 313 P.2d 689 (1957) (shirt).
57
 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 383, 161 A.2d 69, 83 (1960).
58
 See Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process 588-89 (tent. ed. 1958).
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paying for the goods and the plaintiff was such that the
plaintiff would reasonably expect to use the particular pur-
chased goods, even though he was not the one to pay the
seller for them. When such a relationship exists, the plaintiff
would further reasonably expect that nothing of the impor-
tance of compensation for injuries would turn on who paid
for the goods. This expectation has not been disappointed
by this court. Indeed, insofar as legal doctrine with respect
to such a matter could influence pre-accident conduct, a
contrary view could only have tended to interfere with the
generally satisfactory kinds of relationships involved. The
parent-minor child relationship with respect to food, which
is involved in the present case, does not differ significantly
from those with which we have already dealt. We therefore
hold that the plaintiff is not barred by lack of privity of con-
tract from recovering against defendant-retailer for breach
of warranty.
Does the conjunction in the Greenberg opinion of the category
of food and household goods with the category of members of the
buyer's household indicate a basis for decision along the lines sug-
gested? Clearly indicate such a basis for decision? If the basis had
been spelled out more clearly, would the trial courts have subsequently
interpreted Greenberg as they did?
III. Greenberg IN THE TRIAL COURTS
In the months following the Greenberg decision, the trial courts
of New York were called upon to interpret the decision in a consid-
erable number of cases. 5° Of those trial court decisions that are dis-
closed in the reports, only one applies Greenberg beyond its precise
facts.° In that case, the trial court awarded, inter alia, judgment to
59 "Trial courts" in the text refers to courts of first impression. As will be in-
dicated, these courts were typically called upon to interpret Greenberg in the context
of a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
6° Simpson v. Eichenbrunner, 31 Misc. 2d 958, 959, 217 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. T. 1961).
The author's reliance on reported cases for collection of data is, of course, subject
to criticism on the ground of incompleteness and consequent possible distortion. There
is no requirement in New York that an opinion be written in passing on a motion to
dismiss a complaint. Where an opinion is written, its publication depends in the first
instance on the discretion of the trial judge who renders the opinion. Opinions submitted
to the State Reporter for official publication in the New York Miscellaneous Reports
are further screened by him. However, there is no further screening of opinions submitted
for publication in West Publishing Company's New York Supplement, and, in practice,
many opinions published unofficially are later published officially, to assure equal access
for subscribers. See Flavin, Decisions and Opinions for Publication, 12 Syracuse L. Rev.
137, 145 (1960) (Mr. Flavin is the New York State Reporter.), Among those unreported
trial court decisions dealing with the beneficiary problem, one may well suppose that
those taking a less restrictive view of Greenberg were less likely to be re-examined on
appeal and thus are not revealed in the reports at that stage. Nevertheless, what is
revealed in the reports is striking.
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an employee against the retailer of machinery purchased by his em-
ployer. The appellate term affirmed on this aspect of the case, relying
upon an "extension" of Greenberg.
Arnie v. Laurel—The trial court dismissed the complaint of a wife
who was injured mixing cement bought by her husband from defend-
ant-retailer. With reference to the Court of Appeals opinion in Green-
berg, the court said:
It did not . . . indicate any intention to vary the privity
requirement—so clearly stated—in circumstances other than
that there presented. . .. If, as would be required in the
present case, this court should hold that the purchase of a
bag of cement by a husband removed the requirement of
privity of contract in an action by his wife it would be going
far beyond the step just taken by this State's highest court.
However, the appellate division reversed in a memorandum opinion. 02
Rypins v. Rowan°3—A fourteen-year-old girl sought to recover against
the person who installed a combination storm door at a home (pre-
sumably her's), and also against other parties defendant. The trial
court granted a motion to dismiss by one of the other parties, alterna-
tively on the ground that "while the rule with respect to privity of
contract has been relaxed, the relaxation thus far is only with respect
to food and household goods . . ," and plaintiff can not recover
since a combination storm door does not "come within the category
specified in the Greenberg case. . . ."
Leavitt v. Ford Motor Co."—The trial court dismissed a claim by an
automobile buyer, who was injured when a tire blew out, against the
automobile manufacturer. Although the precise issue was that of
direct manufacturer's liability, the opinion contained the statement:
Whether the rule in the Greenberg case should be ex-
tended to automobiles is a matter for the appellate courts to
decide. As the law presently stands, it does not appear that
the Greenberg case has abolished, with respect to all forms
of merchandise, the ancient doctrine that privity of contract
is necessary to support an action for breach of warranty.
Sparling v. Podzielinski"—The trial court granted a motion for sum-
mary judgment in favor of the wholesaler of a water ski tow rope in
an action by the ultimate purchaser of the rope. Again the precise
61 32 Misc. 2d 207, 223 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
62 Arnie v. Laura, 16 App. Div. 2d 736, 226 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1962).
63 30 Misc. 2d 568, 219 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
64 28 Misc. 2d 740, 215 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
65 32 Misc. 2d 227, 223 N.Y.S.2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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question was one of direct liability and Greenberg was distinguished
on that ground, but initially the court said:
[U]ntil the Court of Appeals sees fit to change the rule in
other than food cases, this court is bound to hold that, in
actions like the present one, without privity of contract be-
tween the parties there can be no action on an express or
implied warranty.
Waful v. Contractors Syracuse Sales Co."—The defendant leased cer-
tain construction equipment to a corporation with knowledge that
employees of that corporation and of a second corporation would
use the equipment. The trial court dismissed complaints by three
plaintiffs, one employee of each corporation and the president of both
corporations who alleged that the corporations were simply his "alter
egos." The court did not discuss the question whether the sales war-
ranties were applicable to a lease, but rather rested its decision on
the following interpretation of Greenberg:
It is true that implicit in the Greenberg case is the
recognition that the law will be called upon in the future,
as it has in the past, to adapt itself to the changing realities
of social conditions. This is not, however, a clarion call to
revolution. It permits rather a 'one step at a time' orderly
liberalization within the frame of reference to which the case
addressed itself, i.e., food cases in which there is involved
a principal-agent question as to the purchaser and the
plaintiff.
Serrano v. Riverside Dinette Prods. Co."—The trial court dismissed
a claim against the manufacturer of a dinette chair by a social guest
of the ultimate purchaser. With reference to the Greenberg case, the
court said, "it is to be noted that this action was brought against the
seller, not against the manufacturer, as in the instant case, nor was
the doctrine extended to a casual social guest of the purchaser."
Thomas v. Leary"—The appellate division reversed a trial court
order dismissing a claim by a dental technician against an office equip-
ment supplier who had sold a dental chair to the dentist by whom
plaintiff was employed. The appellate division reasoned:
On logic, as distinguished from an arbitrary limitation,
there should be no distinction between the Greenberg case
and the present case, merely because food and family were
involved in that case and a chair and an employer-employee
as Supra note 37.
67 222 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
os 15 App. Div. 2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1962).
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relationship in this. If the doctrine of strict privity, that is,
answerability only to the immediate purchaser, is to be
liberalized in this state and additional rights given, the
distinguishing facts in these two cases seem to matter little
on the basis of pure legal logic.
Williams v. Union Carbide Corp."—The appellate division in a mem-
orandum opinion, reversed a trial court order dismissing a complaint
by an employee against the defendant who sold a safety mask to
plaintiff's employer.
IV. THE WORK OF THE TRIAL COURTS
A. The Importance of Wise Interpretation
Notice that, save for the Waful case which was not appealed, in
each instance where a restrictive interpretation of Greenberg was
decisive, the decision was overturned by an intermediate appellate
court. Does this mean then that the availability of appeal relieves a
trial judge of the burden of doing his best to interpret wisely court
of appeals opinions? Was the court in Leavitt right in saying that
"whether the rule in the Greenberg case should be extended to auto-
mobiles is a matter for the appellate courts to decide?” 79
Is it important that Greenberg was restrictively interpreted in
some cases in which such an interpretation was not decisive, e.g.,
where there was also an issue of direct liability of the defendant? In
this respect, consider the prospective influence of one published trial
court opinion on others." For example, the construction of Greenberg
in the Leavitt case, where the interpretation was not decisive, was
relied upon in Waful, in which it was. Consider also the way in which
a restrictive interpretation of Greenberg may have tended to divert
attention from the decisive question of direct liability. Later decisions
give every indication that the New York courts are in the process of
judicially recognizing such liability, even in the case of implied
warranties.'
B. The Trial Courts' Work Before Greenberg
As the Greenberg opinion indicates, some lower New York courts,
including trial courts, had previously refused to apply the privity
69 17 App. Div. 2d 661, 230 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1962).
70 Supra note 64; see text following note 48 supra.
71 The extensive publication of New York trial court opinions raises questions that
range beyond the scope of the present problem. However, it should be noted that such
publication affords a ready means for disclosing to appellate courts, legal scholars, law
revision commissions and legislators significant "trouble spots" in the law at the stage
of initial official application.
72
 Hoffman v. Cox, 35 Misc. 2d 103, 229 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Sup. Ct. 1962); see
Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., II N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226
N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (case involving express warranties).
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doctrine in beneficiary cases. Two such trial court cases were Welch
v. Schiebelhuth," an action against the retail seller of cake by the
wife of the purchaser and members of his family who were his guests,
and Parish v. The Great All. & Pac. Tea Co.," an action against the
retailer of jam by the minor children of the purchasing mother. Avoid-
ing the temptation to fictionalize agency relationships, the opinions
in these cases probe in some depth for principles underlying both the
previous refusals to apply the privity doctrine and the implied war-
ranty action for personal injuries itself. The decisions are made to
rest directly upon the principles perceived." Why the change in
approach after Greenberg? Was it all, as it undoubtedly was in part,
a matter of different judicial personnel rendering the decisions? Or
does an opinion such as that written in Greenberg constitute an invita-
tion to superficial thinking on the part of trial courts and to abdication
of their responsibility for the creative development of the law? Can
a trial court judge consciously accept such invitations without violat-
ing his oath of office?
C. A Few Suggestions on Point of View in Interpretation of New
Legal Doctrine
"Some day we shall have a real study of how far courts of first
instance really apply the rules laid down by courts of appeals. Interim
studies suggest that the answer is not too much."76
The problem, as Professor Llewellyn recognized, is largely
one of crowded calendars that severely limit the trial judge's op-
portunities for research and reflection on difficult legal questions.
To this extent, a solution lies beyond the scope of the present discus-
sion. Perhaps, however, some progress might be achieved in dealing
with decisions like Greenberg by a consideration of the point of view
from which they ought to be interpreted.
The principal difficulty lies, does it not, in ascertaining the extent
to which those prior precedents that were not expressly overruled
possess continued vitality. In the present situation the most trouble-
some prior precedent is Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co.,'" a 1923 decision
in which the court of appeals denied warranty recovery to a waitress
injured by a nail embedded in cake bought by her restaurant em-
ployer from defendant bakery and served to her at lunch. This is the
principal case in New York which is regarded as establishing a "gen-
73 11 Misc. 2d 312, 169 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
74 177 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. City Munic. Ct. 1958).
75 See also the trial court opinion in Greenberg itself. 14 Misc. 2d 279, 178 N.Y.S.2d
404 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957).
76 Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 710 n.36
(1936).
77 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
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eral rule" that sales warranties can benefit only the buyer. From this
general rule, it is said, the Greenberg case carves out an area of excep-
tions. Thus, a non-buyer plaintiff is placed in the position of assuming
a burden of showing that he comes within the exceptions. This, in
turn, will often involve a showing that the court of appeals intended
to base its decision on wider rather than narrower grounds.
But, consider the soundness of this point of view in the light
of the following passage:
Although decided cases should be presumed valid as au-
thority, the presumption should be a rebuttable one, for if a
lower court can discern from the rationalized doctrinal trend
of the highest court that an old precedent is no longer in
harmony with the body of law which the latter is developing,
it would be remiss in its duty if it did not refuse to follow the
isolated precedent."
In the view of its author, this approach involves
. . . an acceptance of the premise that stare decisis is the
organizing principle of the legal system, and that if it is to
work as such, it must be assumed that there are rational
grounds for the decisions above."
Can it be doubted that Greenberg was part of a doctrinal trend
in the area of beneficiaries of sales warranties? That the doctrinal
trend had been rationalized (albeit without great clarity) in the
evolution from presumptive agency to considerations of "fairness"
and "justice" relating at least to food and household goods used by
members of the buyer's household? 8° Can the logical implications of
this doctrinal trend be squared with a "general rule" that only buyers
are benefited by sales warranties? R ' Notice that the Court of Appeals
made no effort to square them.
Once a trial judge rids himself of the "general rule" of the Chysky
case he ought then to be free to ascertain whether the logical implica-
78 Comment, Stare Decisis in the Lower Courts, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 504, 508.09
(1959).
79 Id. at .509.
8° The significance of Judge Froessel's concurrence based upon factual evidence of
agency should have been appreciated in the trial courts. In an important recent Court of
Appeals decision involving direct manufacturer's liability, a concurring opinion by Judge
Froessel is similarly useful in interpreting the majority opinion. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v.
American Cyanamid Co., supra note 72.
81 Compare the following language from the appellate term opinion allowing
recovery in Greenberg:
The wave of the present, as we have seen . . . has been sweeping away
the spurious barrier of privity in these cases. The current of the law is sufficiently
potent to clear its own channel. We conceive it to be our duty, therefore, to
recognize the event and act on it.
12 Misc. 2d 883, 887, 178 N.Y.S.2d 407, 411.
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tions of Greenberg extend to the particular case before him, and,
if they do, whether there are other principles of greater persuasive
force indicating a contrary result. Viewed in this light, the privity
doctrine in beneficiary cases, even as applied to the precise facts of
Chysky, must stand on its own merits. Could it have done so in any
of the beneficiary cases which arose in the New York trial courts?
V. THE POSSIBILITY OF STATING BROADER REASONS FOR DECISION
In deciding Greenberg the Court of Appeals may have been con-
cerned with more than preserving the integrity of certain kinds of rela-
tionships by satisfying the expectations generated by them.' The refer-
ences to "injustice" and "unfairness" suggest that application of the
privity doctrine in beneficiary cases results in something less than an
even-handed application of the basic economic principles of absolute
enterprise liability—of which implied warranty liability for personal
injuries is a species."
These economic principles are comprehensively analyzed in a
thoughtful article by Professor Calabresi." Briefly stated, enter-
prise liability involves, in the first place, the principle of resource
allocation:
Not charging an enterprise with a cost which arises from it
leads to an understatement of the true cost of producing its
goods; the result is that people purchase more of those goods
than they would want if their true cost were reflected in price.
On the other hand, placing a cost not related to the scope of
an enterprise on that enterprise results in an overstatement
of the costs of those goods and leads to their underproduc-
tion. Either way the postulate that people are by and large
best off if they can choose what they want, on the basis of
what it costs our economy to produce it, would be violated."
The shifting of losses from buying consumer to seller, while not
82 See 13 Syracuse L. Rev. 174, 176 (1961). The other law review case notes on
Greenberg blithely took for granted that the decision was limited to its facts. See 25
Albany L. Rev. 332 (1961) ; 28 13rooklyn L. Rev. 171 (1961).
83
 See James, supra note 53, at 923-25. In his concurring opinion in Greenberg,
Judge Froessel quotes with approval the statement of the dissenting justice in the
appellate term that "it may be odd that the purchaser can recover while others cannot,
but it is odder still that one without fault has to pay at all." 12 Misc. 2d at 890, 178
N.Y.S.2d at 414. Does this observation not come a little late in the day? In 1931, Judge
Cardozo, speaking for the Court of Appeals, held the retailer of packaged and branded
bread containing a pin liable for personal injuries sustained by the purchaser's husband,
rejecting the argument that recovery for breach of the warranty of merchantable
quality was limited to the value of a sound loaf. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores,
Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931),
84
 Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale
L.J. 499 (1961).
85 Id. at 514.
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required by "pure" resource allocation theory, is necessary because
buying consumers are not likely to insure, and, without insurance,
accident costs are not likely to be reflected in the cost of goods to
buyers generally.86
 If anything, there may be greater necessity for
shifting the losses of nonbuying consumers."
In the second place, enterprise liability in general, and implied
warranty liability in particular, involves the principle of spreading
losses:
[ S] ocial dislocations, like economic dislocations, will occur
more frequently if one person bears a heavy loss than if
many people bear light ones. One can, of course, conceive of
situations where the extra $1 charged to one thousand people
would be one thousand straws which would break one thou-
sand backs and ruin one thousand homes or businesses, while
$1,000 charged to one person would only ruin him, albeit
thoroughly. But such situations seem mildly unlikely."
The principle of spreading losses certainly applies with equal force
to non-buying consumers.
Viewed in the light of these principles, Greenberg was easy, was
it not? So were most of the trial court beneficiary cases, were they
not? As Justice Traynor has stated in a related context, "liability
should not be determined mechanically by fortuitous circumstances.
. . It should not be controlling that the consumer is found to be in
privity of-contract with the defendant rather than not!'"
Why then refrain from setting forth the underlying principles as
reasons for decision in the Greenberg situation? Is it because the
principles are not susceptible to judicial statement? Consider the
following passage, also from the pen of Justice Traynor:
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unpre-
pared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and
the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune
to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed
among the public as a cost of doing business."
Or is it because these principles are foreign to the overall bargain
character of the Uniform Sales Act in which the implied warranty of
merchantable quality is contained? As a matter of first impression,
much could be said for this position in terms of the understanding of
80
 See id. at 505-06.
87 See id. at 506.
88
 Id. at 518.
89
 Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal. 2d 217, 236, 324 P.2d 583, 594-95 (1958)
(separate opinion).
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436,
441 (1944) (concurring opinion).
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the draftsmen," and of the language employed. As Dean Prosser has
indicated, there are substantial difficulties to be overcome if any per-
sonal injury actions are to be brought within the Sales Act,' and it has
been proposed that an independent tort basis for such actions without
fault be recognized." By the time of Greenberg, however, the New
York courts had long since accepted the implied warranty procedure
and had gone rather far in overcoming the difficulties."
Is there a more basic reason for refraining from stating these
principles? Recall Professor Keeton's statement that "expression of a
narrower ground of decision may appropriately be chosen where the
court's attraction to the broader principle falls short of conviction.""
Professor Keeton cites in support of this conclusion an analysis by
Professor Llewellyn." In this analysis Professor Llewellyn is con-
cerned with the problem of ascertaining the scope of the "problem
situation" with which an appellate court in a given case should deal.
For example, in Greenberg, the Court of Appeals might have purported
to decide (1) a case in which a minor daughter is injured by unwhole-
some food that was purchased by her father at her request, or (2) a
case in which a member of the buyer's household is injured by un-
wholesome food, or (3) a case in which a member of the buyer's
household is injured by defective household goods generally, or (4) a
91
 See Professor Ehrenzweig's study for the New York State Law Revision Com-
mission, N.Y. State Law Rev. Comm'n Rep., N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65 (J) 17 n,61
(1943).
02 Prosser, supra note 41, at 1124-34.
93
 Id. at 1134; Restatement (Second), Torts § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
The Court of Appeals in Greenberg seemed to show little interest in abandoning the Sales
Act implied warranty provisions as the basis of the retailer's obligation. While the
opinion refers to the tort origins of the warranty cause of action, the reference appears
to be solely for the purpose of demonstrating that the Sales Act provisions are not
burdened by history with a privity requirement.
91
 See Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, supra note 83 (Damages for personal
injuries held recoverable under implied warranty of merchantable quality) ; Bernstein
v. Queens County Jockey Club, 222 App. Div. 191, 225 N.Y. Supp. 449 (1927) (Action
for personal injuries for breach of implied warranty held abated by death of defendant
under statute preserving contract actions but not personal injury actions) ; Greco v.
S. S. Kresge .Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E.2d 557 (1938) (Breach of implied warranty
causing death held a "default" or "wrongful act" within the meaning of the wrongful
death statute) ; Kennedy v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 205 App. Div. 648, 200 N.Y. Supp.
121 (1923) (Notice of breach of warranty required under Uniform Sales Act § 49 held
unnecessary where personal injury caused by goods sold for immediate human con-
sumption) ; Linn v. Radio City Delicatessen, 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. City
Munic. Ct. 1939) (Disclaimer by food manufacturer of implied warranties held invalid
as against public policy in action over by retailer for damages paid to injured
customer). See also N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 150(1)(d) (Uniform Sales Act § 69(1)(d)),
as amended, L. 1948 ch. 276 (Amendment allows recovery of uncompensated damages
even after rescission, return of goods and recovery of price). But see Blessington v.
McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953) (Implied warranty action
for personal injuries held subject to statute of limitations on implied contracts, rather
than to shorter statute on negligence actions).
Oh Supra note 93.
00 Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960),
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case involving a certain kind of relationship between the buyer and
the injured party with respect to the particular defective goods, or
(5) some other narrow or broad sort of case. As has been indicated,"
certain rather clear limitations may be imposed by the guidance
function of courts of last resort on the choice of the appropriate prob-
lem situation. But apart from these, the choice is a subtle one. Pro-
fessor Llewellyn says the following:
No rule or principle can ever, in such a choice, tell any court,
in concretely definitive terms, what scope "the" problem-
situation before it has, or, more accurately, is best made to
have. There is a line of guidance, but it speaks only to con-
science plus judgment. That line is: "the" problem-situation
extends as far as you are perfectly clear, in your own mind,
that you have grasped the picture fully and completely in
life-essence and in its detailed variants, and therefore know
it to present a significantly single whole, and one over which
your knowledge and judgment have command. That far, it is
wise to deal with it, and right to deal with it, because small
things take on fuller meaning in the context of greater ones.
And also because the law does well to trend into ever larger
unities, so long as they remain meaningful as they grow. But
those unities must be and remain meaningful, over their
whole scope, in terms of life and sense, not merely in terms
of formula and "sound," else they do harm. That is why
a court is doing its duty when, contrary to the sense you
see and desire, but with clear consciousness that it under-
stands what it is doing and why, and with clear statement
of both, it goes to bat on the whole of a broad situation.
But that is also why any doubt about whether the court
has the whole situation in sure grasp is to be resolved by the
court always in favor of a narrower rather than a wider
scope."
Does this argument indicate that a court should refrain from
setting forth the broad economic principles of resource allocation and
spreading losses if it is not certain that they would properly control
the decision in every case in which one or both" were applicable? Or
97 See part II supra.
9S Llewellyn, op. cit. supra note 96, at 427.
Dio Even within the area of implied warranty liability the principles of resource
allocation and spreading losses may, in some instances, point to opposite results. If, for
example, the product involved would not foreseeably cause personal injuries even if
defective, it would be unlikely that a seller would insure against such injuries. Thus,
while the resource allocation theory would call for the imposition of warranty liability,
the theory of spreading losses would not. See Calabresi, supra note 84, at 528-29.
Quaere whether this analysis might not justify a decision such as that reached by the
trial court in Arnie v. Laurc, supra note 61 & text. (The analysis, of course, would bar
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can a distinction be drawn between the statement of the "problem
situation" over which a court purports to rule and the statement of
broader principles for decision that plainly do not constitute present
rulings on other fact situations? The latter would amount to frankly
open-ended reasoning, demanding subsequent consideration of the
stated principles when they are applicable, but also inviting considera-
tion by lawyers and trial judges of other authorities and principles
that may be shown to carry greater weight.'''' In this view, lawyers
and trial judges could be given the means to play more creative roles
in the evolution of legal doctrine, and the potentialities for doing the
job right in the trial courts would seem to be enhanced.
E]ven where rules are quite fully particularized and well
accepted, they are subject to being tested against concepts
of more generalized character, described in a variety of ways
as principles, policy considerations, economic and social im-
plications, factors of practical import and so on. . . [O]c-
casionally, especially in developing and disputed areas of the
law, the more generalized considerations are brought to the
foreground and are explicitly relied upon in testing and re-
affirming, modifying or abandoning the more particular,
categorical formulations. The interplay of the general and
the particular, of the rules and the reasons, is essential to
the preservation of an ideal accommodation of creativity and
continuity, and it is desirable that it occur openly in judicial
opinions.'
recovery by the buyer as well as by others.) Compare, however, situations in which
some personal injuries are foreseeable from use of the product—albeit only to a relatively
small group of "allergic" users. See Horowitz, Allergy of the Plaintiff as a Defense in
Actions Based Upon Breach of Implied Warranty of Quality, 24 So. Cal. L. Rev. 221
(1951). Similarly, cases denying recovery when there has been improper or unusual
use of the product, see Prosser, supra note 41 at 1144, may be viewed as refusals to
apply the loss spreading theory because, under the resource allocation theory, the injury
should properly be charged as a cost of the particular use rather than as a cost of the
product itself.
100
 In the present context, one such principle may be that the cost to the general
public of certain essential products or services should not be raised by the imposition
of absolute enterprise liability, See Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123
N.E.2d 792 (1954); Krom v. Sharp & Dohme, 7 App. Div. 2d 761, 180 N.Y.S.2d 99
(1958). Another may be that absolute enterprise liability should not be imposed where
it would have the practical effect of deterring entirely or delaying the marketing of
valuable new products. See 13 Stan. L. Rev. 645, 649-50 (1961). But see Gottsdanker
v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960). A third may be that
absolute enterprise liability should not be imposed on the manufacturer of a product
defective only in the sense that all products of its type may cause harm, if the potential
harm is widely known and no representation is made as to the product's safety. See Judge
Goodrich's concurring opinion in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d
292, 301 (3d Cir. 1961). Such a determination would rest, at least in part, on the
traditional notion that a person must bear those risks that he has knowingly assumed.
101
 Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 463, 496-97
(1962).
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